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ESSAY
Cass Sunstein's "New Deal"
for Free Speech: Is It an
"Un-American" Theory of Speech?
BY RICHARD J. VANGELISTI*
Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when
the government'spurposes are beneficent.
- Justice Louis Brandeis
INTRODUCTION
T he information and broadcast age has magnified the role of
speech in our society and in shaping our behavior and beliefs.
Along with this enhanced role, speech is increasingly blamed for a vast
number of social ills including violence in the streets, wealth-driven
politics, and an uninformed citizenry. Accordingly, new debates are
spawned about the meaning and role of the First Amendment in our
everyday lives. This Essay will focus on one view of the First Amend-
ment.
The First Amendment commands:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard A. Schell, Chief Judge, United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. J.D. 1995, Southern
Methodist University; B.A. 1991, Arizona State University. Following comple-
tion of his judicial clerkship in August 1997, the author will join the Dallas
office of Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. as an associate. The author is solely
responsible for the content and opinions expressed in this Essay.
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speech, or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'
This Essay focuses on the interpretation of this constitutional requirement
developed by University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein:
Congress shall make laws regulating freedom of speech and the press,
including the broadcasting and print media, in a benign effort to make
citizens virtuous and to foster deliberative democracy.
Sunstein has written two books dealing with the proper conception of
self-government and the First Amendment. The two books go hand-in-
hand. In the first book, The Partial Constitution,2 Sunstein articulates his
theory of self-governance - Madisonian Republicanism. Under this
theory, citizens govern themselves by electing a body of representatives
who are charged with deliberating until they determine the public good
for all of society to live by. Unlike the interest-group pluralism theory,
Sunstein's theory does not permit legislative results that are simply an
equilibrium of naked preferences as expressed by various self-interested
groups.
In the second book, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,3
Sunstein develops his First Amendment theory. Not surprisingly,
Sunstein's Madisonian Republicanism drives his First Amendment theory.
His theory rejects the conventional thinking that the First Amendment is
primarily a shield that protects speakers from government censorship.
Instead, Sunstein views the First Amendment as a sword that the
government must use to fight for Madisonian ideals of deliberative
democracy. Sunstein suggests that the government control the quality of
information in society so that citizens will become more informed and
therefore virtuous. The First Amendment then constitutionally requires
government to "promote greater attention to public issues" and "ensure
greater diversity of view."' This Essay focuses on what Sunstein calls a
"New Deal"5 for speech as it relates to broadcasting because the
broadcasting form of speech captures most of Sunstein's First Amend-
ment theory. In the broadcasting context, Sunstein believes that govern-
ment should discourage Melrose Place, 90210, and the Simpsons while
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 CAss R. SUNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) [hereinafterTl-m
PARTiAL CONSTITUTION].
3 CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH].
4 Id. at 20-23.
- Id. at 16-52.
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encouraging shows like the News Hour with Jim Lehrer, Sesame Street,
and Crossfire.
This Essay demonstrates that Sunstein's interpretation of the First
Amendment is a foreigner on the landscape of traditional First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. This critique articulates three central criticisms of
Sunstein's theory. First, Sunstein's interpretation of the First Amendment
is extreme because when the First Amendment was drafted, it had little
to do with Madisonian Republicanism. Second, Sunstein's theory of the
First Amendment is "un-American" because it subverts the American
tradition of cherishing individual liberty in favor of state conceptions of
the public good. Third, Sunstein's New Deal regulation of speech is just
another recipe for regulatory disaster that produces the opposite of its
intended effects and that invites governmental abuse. Sunstein takes the
First Amendment, Americans' sturdiest shield against government
oppression, and transforms it into a sword of the state to coerce each
individual into becoming a virtuous citizen as defined by the state.
Part I describes and critiques Sunstein's Madisonian Republicanism
theory of self-government.6 Part II discusses and challenges Sunstein's
belief that the law and the state are the central factors in shaping human
affairs.7 Part I will discuss Sunstein's New Deal for speech, the
centerpiece of his First Amendment theory.8 Part IV describes Sunstein's
New Deal for broadcasting.9 Part V critiques Sunstein's theory."
I. CIVIC REPUBLICAmSM
A. Sunstein's Madisonian Conception
The central tenet of Sunstein's theory of the First Amendment is his
commitment to a civic republicanism conception of democracy. From the
civic republicanism point of view, democracy must "'refine and enlarge
the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their country
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations.""' Sunstein adopts this view
6 See infra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 44-83 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 84-173 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 174-94' and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 195-280 and accompanying text.
"HET PARTML CONSTITUTrON, supra note 2, at 20 (quoting THE FEDER-
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of republicanism from James Madison's federalist writings, and this Essay
refers to this view of republicanism as "Madisonian Republicanism."
Madisonian Republicanism is rooted in the classic republicanism that through
deliberation representatives of the people could arrive at a single conception
of the public good or virtue." The antifederalists thought that classic
republicanism could be achieved only through small communities that shared
similar interests. 3 Madison, however, argued that republicanism could
operate in a large democracy with a small degree of homogeneity. Madison
reasoned that the larger number of factions in a large democracy would offset
each other and pave the way for political deliberation. 4
Under the Madisonian Republicanism view, political deliberation is the
process of self-government of the people. The first step of this process is
broad participation of the citizenry in electing their representatives.'5 Ideally,
the citizenry is well-educated and informed about the public issues that will
be resolved by the representatives.' 6 The enlightened citizenry elects their
representatives. Once elected, the representatives, who of course will have a
plurality of interests, deliberate until they have arrived at a course of action
that will achieve "'the general benefit of the whole community.""
17
According to Sunstein, the representatives would determine the public good
or general benefit by reference to a pre-political theory of a "good human
life."' 8 Rather than attempting to satisfy naked preferences of the citizenry,
the representatives would develop their conception of the public good with
the help of an independent political or moral theory, e.g., a Rawlsian
contractarian view.' 9 The representatives would deliberate until they arrived
at a determination of the public good, and then they would compare that
conception to an independent political or moral theory.
B. Interest Group Pluralism
Sunstein articulates his civic republicanism by distinguishing his view of
self-government from the contrary viewpoint of interest group pluralism.
ALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
12 THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 20-21.
'3 Id. at 20.
14 Id. at 20-21.
'1 Id. at 135.
16 Id. at 137.
'7 Id. at 22-23 (quoting Roger Sherman, Statement at the Constitutional
Convention).
18 Id. at 185.
'I Id. at 186.
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According to interest group pluralism, various self-interested groups made
up of the citizenry exert pressure on the elected representatives." The
representatives in turn legislate in a way that serves the self-interest of a
particular group or groups. When the representatives legislate, they may:
(1) aggregate, if possible, the various competing interests, (2) trade off
the various interests, or (3) partially compromise their interests.2 The
end result of this process is often a political equilibrium that mirrors the
power of the respective interest groups. Proponents of interest group
pluralism argue that this view most accurately describes how self-
government works in reality, and that in this view the political equilibri-
um achieved is in fact justified by reference to the democratic process
itself.22
Sunstein rejects interest group pluralism because he believes a
political result based on raw power is illegitimate.' Sunstein argues that
this type of political result violates the "principle of impartiality."
Sunstein explains:
Drawing from our founding aspirations, we might even define authori-
tarian systems as all those that justify government outcomes by
reference to power or will rather than by reference to reasons. At the
heart of the liberal tradition and its opposition to authoritarianism lies
a requirement ofjustification by reference to public-regarding explana-
tions that are intelligible to all citizens. The principle of impartiali-
ty is the concrete manifestation of this commitment in American
constitutional law.'
Accordingly, on the one hand, political outcomes are illegitimate if they
solely reflect the "naked preferences" of powerful interest groups. On the
other hand, political outcomes are legitimate if they promote a general
public good." Sunstein illustrates this view by reference to a number of
constitutional requirements. For example, the Equal Protection Clause
requires a legitimate public purpose if the laws of the state treat two
classes of people differently. 6 Another example is the Commerce Clause
20 Id. at 25.
21 Id.
2 Id.
2 Id.
2 4 Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
21 Id. at 26.26 Id.
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that allows a state to discriminate against the commerce of another state
only when the discriminating state has shown a legitimate interest other
than promoting in-state business.27
C. Critique of Sunstein 's Madisonian Republicanism
The central criticism of Sunstein's Madisonian Republicanism is that
this theory of democracy is only a single shade of many colors competing
for the "true" conception of self-government. In general, "republicanism"
has been a label for ideals of the public good separate from economic
forces.28 In contrast, "liberalism" has been a label for "a subjective
theory of value, a conception of individual self-interest as the only
legitimate animating force in society, a night-watchman state, and denial
of any conception of an autonomous public interest independent of the
sum of individual interests." '29 These competing conceptions of individu-
als and their methods of self-government have complex roots. For
example, in the late Eighteenth Century, Adam Smith described the role
of law as a tool to perfect society and human nature. 0 During the same
time period, James Wilson, a signatory of the Constitution from
Pennsylvania, stated that the state was to respect liberties and privileges
that were bestowed independent of the state.3" This diversity of view
continued into the debates surrounding the American Constitutional
Convention. 2 Perhaps any attempt to define a single, correct conception
of self-government is difficult.
When the Constitution was drafted, the framers were already
abandoning the civic republicanism conception of self-government.33 In
1786, Charles Thompson, a political figure from Pennsylvania, noted that
Americans had an interest only in individual happiness.3 4 Also, as early
as 1782, Thomas Jefferson stated that individuals should not surrender
themselves to the state.35 In 1785, Noah Webster, a Federalist, warned
that virtue and patriotism should not constitute self-government because
271d.
2 Morton I Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1832 (1987).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1831.
31 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 539-40 (1969).
32 Id. at 536-43.
13 Id. at 606-15.
34 Id. at 610.
35 Id.
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self-interest would always be the driving force of individuals.36 In fact,
in 1791 James Madison recognized that republicanism endangered liberty
because individuals may begin to devalue their own interests. 7
Another powerful critique of Sunstein's Madisonian Republicanism
is that representatives are unable to determine the public good as an
epistemological matter and even if they could, they would not do it -
instead they would advance their self interests.38 Sunstein believes that
through deliberation, representatives will transform their initial, respec-
tive positions into one single conception of the public good.39 Sunstein
offers a Rawlsian contractarian method of determining the public good,
but this method of determining a moral or social code of conduct is only
one of many methods. Moreover, even if the representatives could in fact
agree on a single method of determining the public good, they may still
arrive at wildly divergent views of the public good. Even if they could
arrive at a single conception of the public good, the representatives,
as a practical matter, may not be under any compulsion to follow it
depending on the influence of their constituents. In the context of
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, Judge Posner
explains:
Many public policies are better explained as the outcome of a pure
power struggle - clothed in a rhetoric of public interest that is a mere
figleaf- among narrow interest or pressure groups....
If it is true that we have a government of powers and interests
rather than of general-welfare maximization, and if this pattern is an
inevitable, and perhaps ultimately a desirable, feature of our society...
then it would be a mistake to require that legislation, to withstand a
challengebased on alleged arbitrariness or discrimination, be reasonably
related to some general social goal. The real "justification" for most
legislation is simply that it is the product of the constitutionally created
political process of our society.4"
36 id.
37 Id. at 612.
" Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism - Or the Flight from
Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1637, 1639 (1988).
39 See supra Part L.A (notes 11-19 and accompanying text).
40 Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 27-29.
1996-97]
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At a minimum, Sunstein's Madisonian Republicanism fails to accurately
account for the continual struggle for pure power in human affairs and
even in the most advanced legislative processes.
Yet another serious critique of Sunstein's Madisonian Republicanism
is that it undermines other nonpolitical associations in society such as
family and religion.4 Families or religious associations certainly
articulate universal truths that may diverge from the republicanism public
good.42 Why should we respect a legislator's conception of a just life
over the holy teachings of a rabbi or a priest? Moreover, civic republican-
ism may place a heavy burden on the energies of a citizen and divert
those energies away from family and religious life.43 Do we want a self-
government that distracts us from these central activities of human life?
D. Sunstein 's New Deal for Free Speech Serves Madisonian Ideals
Madisonian Republicanism is the driving force behind Sunstein's
theory of free speech. Sunstein argues that the central purpose of the First
Amendment is to bring about broad political deliberation as conceived by
Madisonian Republicanism. Sunstein believes that under this view, the
First Amendment not only affords political speech the highest protection
from government censorship, but it also requires government to ensure a
healthy caldron of political speech. In effect, the First Amendment
requires the government to encourage attention to public issues and
promote diversity of view. But before Sunstein can transform the First
Amendment into a tool of government intervention, he must offer a new
conception of the state in relation to the lives of individuals.
II. NEUTRALITY AND STATE ACTION
A. Sunstein Analyzes "Status Quo Neutrality"
The key to Sunstein's new vision of the state is his analysis of "status
quo neutrality." Sunstein explains that true neutrality in our constitutional
41 KathleenM. Sullivan, RainbowRepublicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1719-
20 (1988).
42 Id. at 1719.
3 Id. As simply an empirical matter, civic republicanism probably would
not garnish the required citizen participation. For example, in the 1992
presidential election only 61% of eligible voters went to the polls to cast a ballot.
That turnout was the highest since 1972. THE 1994 INFORMATION PLEASE
ALMANAC 642 (47th ed. 1994).
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framework requires that when the government acts it must reflect a
commitment to the public good rather than a show of favoritism towards
one group or another.' The government in effect is a neutral referee
that calls the plays between citizens. Sunstein, however, notes that
scholars disagree over what "neutrality" requires the government to do or
refrain from doing. Sunstein explains what he believes to be the
prevailing conception:
[N]eutrality ... [takes] as a given and as the baseline for decision, the
status quo, or what various people and groups now have: existing
distributions of property, income, legal entitlements, wealth, so-called
natural assets, and preferences. A departure from the status quo signals
partisanship; respect for the status quo signals neutrality. When
government does not interfere with existing distributions, it is adhering
to the neutrality requirement, and it rarely needs to justify its decision
at all. When it disrupts existing arrangements, it is behaving partially,
and is thus subject to constitutional doubt. Current rights of ownership
are not seen as a product of law at all."
Based on this conception of "status quo neutrality," Sunstein challenges
the notion that the state acts only when it disrupts existing arrangements.
Sunstein argues that the state is always acting because the legal enforce-
ment of existing arrangements would be impossible without action of the
state.
46
Sunstein illustrates his analysis of status quo neutrality by reference
to two Supreme Court decisions - Plessy v. Ferguson47 and Lochner v.
New York.41 Sunstein argues that in each of these cases "the Court took
existing practices as the baseline for deciding issues of neutrality and
partisanship."'49 The Court considered the existing practices and distribu-
tions as pre-political and natural rather than resulting from the function
of law."0 From this premise, the Court reasoned that the particular
practices or distributions in question were not subject to challenge from
the standpoint of constitutional justice."1 For example, in Plessy, the
44 THE PARTIAL CoNsTrrUTIoN, supra note 2, at 2.
41 Id. at3.
46Id. at 4-5.
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
48 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
49 THE PARTIAL CoNsTrrUTIoN, supra note 2, at 41.50 Id.
51 Id.
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Court reasoned that a social sphere exists in which the laws of the state
do not operate. 2 The Court further reasoned that any discrimination that
Plessy felt was caused by established usages, customs, and traditions of
the people rather than by an act of the state. 3
Sunstein argues that the Court's reasoning demonstrates that the Court
viewed the common law of tort, contract, and property as part of the
"natural state" rather than the realm of laws.14 Furthermore, Sunstein
argues that for the Court the common law merely reflected social customs
and practices, areas in which the legislature had no power.55 Similarly,
when the Court invalidated a maximum hour law for bakers in Lochner,
Sunstein believes it reasoned that, absent a common law wrong, the right
to freely contract displaced any attempt by the legislature to redistribute
benefits from one group to another. 6 Sunstein characterizes the Court's
reasoning in these cases as strict adherence to status quo neutrality -
current rights of ownership are not a product of law and the principle of
neutrality forbids the Court from meddling in this realm. 7
B. Sunstein Views Status Quo Neutrality as a Mistake
Sunstein rejects status quo neutrality as a descriptive model for our
legal and social arrangements.58 Sunstein explains:
Status quo neutrality disregards the fact that existing rights, and hence
the status quo, are in an important sense a product of law. It is a matter
of simple fact that people own things only because the law permits them
to do so. Without law, no one can "ow"f anything, at least not in the
sense that we understand the notion of ownership. Status quo neutrality
is a mistake precisely to the extent that it overlooks the fact that our
rights, including our rights of ownership, are creations of law. 9
52 Id. at 43; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
S THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 43; Plessy, 163 U.S. at
551.
5" THE PARTIAL CONsTITuTIoN, supra note 2, at 43.
55 Id.56 Id. at 47-48.
57 Id.
58 Sunstein also rejects status quo neutrality as a method of deciding issues
of constitutional law. Id. at 117-19.59 Id. at 4.
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For Sunstein, the exercise of rights concerning our freedom of movement,
contract, and disposition of property would be meaningless unless we
secure those rights with the brute force of the state.6 ' For example, the
law of tort protects our well-being; the law of contract protects our right
to enter into agreements; and the law of trespass ensures the enjoyment
of our property. Status quo neutrality falsely characterizes these secured
rights as pre-political and justified as a product of the natural rights of
humans.6
1
Thus, according to Sunstein, the Court in Plessy and Lochner failed
to appreciate that segregation in Plessy and unequal bargaining power
of the bakers in Lochner were creations of law.62 In Plessy, the Court
wrongly assumed that segregation had nothing to do with the Louisiana
statute providing "equal but separate accommodations., 63 And in
Lochner, the Court wrongly assumed that unequal bargaining power
between employers and employees was not caused by the enforcement
of property and contract law.' Sunstein seizes upon the Court's
reasoning in West Coast Hotel v. Parish.65 In West Coast Hotel, the
Court reasoned that in the absence of a minimum wage law for women,
the state, through the protection of free markets and the common law,
subsidized "unconscionable employers. 66 When the employers refused
to pay a higher wage, it was the law of contract that secured the
employers' right to pay only the bargained price. Status quo neutrality,
for Sunstein, incorrectly depicts the state's role as impartial when in fact
the state enforces and therefore sanctions any pre-existing distribution of
rights.
C. "State Action" Allows a New Deal for Free Speech
Sunstein's thesis is that the state acts both when it disrupts existing
arrangements and also when it sanctions or enforces existing arrange-
ments. Sunstein next explains how this new view of state action relates
to free speech.
60 Id. at5.
61 Id. at 4-5.
62 Id. at 42, 44, 47-48.
63 Id. at 42-43.
6 Id. at 50.
65 West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). This case marked the
end of the Lochner era because the Court upheld a minimum wage law for
women.
66 Id. at 399; see THE PARTIAL CoNsTITUToN, supra note 2, at 46.
1996-971
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Constitutional requirements apply only to the actions of the state or
federal government.67 Before the Constitution can indirectly reach
private individuals, there must be some state action. Traditionally, the
state action doctrine requires that there is sufficient action by the state to
invoke constitutional requirements between or among private individuals.
While Sunstein argues that he does not want to abandon the state action
requirement,68 he does want to "reconceive" the doctrine.69 Sunstein
accepts the breadth of the traditional conception of state action, but he
wants to refocus the question on whether there is a violation of a
constitutional provision.7" In this new conception, state action applies
when the government "acts" and a provision of the Constitution is
implicated in the issue to be decided.7
In this conception, the first query is whether the government is in
some way involved in private affairs; and the second query is whether
the government is following the constitutional commandments. The end
result of this new conception of state action is that there is a very narrow
area to which the actions of the state do not reach. Sunstein states this
view:
I emphasize that this view does not suggest that "everything is state
action" or that the decisions of ordinary people are subject to constitu-
tional constraints. When one person excludes another from his own
home, there is no state action; the state action consists only in the
availability or actual use of the trespass laws.... It is only state action
that is state action; and that is how I propose to shift the analysis.72
Thus, whenever a private individual uses the laws (including the common
laws of property, contract, and tort), the state acts in the non-legal sense
of the term. In Sunstein's view, the doctrine of state action would be
implicated if in addition to the state's "action," a provision of the
Constitution is implicated. With respect to speech, Sunstein indicates that
the state acts in almost every instance. For example, Sunstein states that
"the use of trespass law to exclude political protesters from a shopping
center is unquestionably state action .... The same is true for the use of
67 THE PARTiAL CoNsTIuTION, supra note 2, at 71.
68 Id. at 75.
69 Id. at 159-61.
70 Id. at 160.
71 Id. at 160-61.
72 Id.
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federal law allocating broadcasting licenses to prevent people from
speaking on the networks." '73
The net effect of Sunstein's new conception of state action is that the
Constitution (particularly the First Amendment) reaches further into the
affairs of private individuals than it did under the traditional conception
of state action. If private individuals rely on the law of contract, property,
or tort in any way to govern speech between or among themselves, the
First Amendment is always at issue. So, if a private broadcasting
corporation uses the law of property to exclude others from broadcasting
on its licensed frequency, then the state has acted and the First Amend-
ment is automatically implicated.
In addition to the revised conception of state action, Sunstein also
would rely on his analysis of status quo neutrality to show that the First
Amendment is implicated in almost every instance of speech by private
individuals. Recall that, under Sunstein's analysis, our current rights are
created and distributed by the force of law. Thus, our respective rights to
speak exist by operation of law. And because the law is the tool that
government uses to regulate, the government in effect regulates private
individuals' respective rights to speak. This proposition is one of
Sunstein's key premises in his argument for a New Deal for free speech.
D. Critique of Sunstein's Conception of Neutrality
Sunstein's criticism of status quo neutrality is essential to his free
speech theory. Recall that under the Madisonian Republicanism concep-
tion, the First Amendment requires the state to regulate speech of private
individuals in a way that promotes deliberative democracy. Therefore,
Sunstein must show that the state is somehow already acting in the affairs
of private individuals. He does this by arguing that individuals' respective
speech rights are in fact a product of law that is created by the state.74
The focus of this critique is that Sunstein has incorrectly described
individual's speech rights as wholly a product of the state.
First, as an empirical matter, individuals exercise their rights (whether
granted by state or deity) quite independent of any enactment of law or
any threat of force. Although force may be a factor when one individual
excludes another from his or her property, the greater reality is a common
respect for the property rights of another stemming from human
psychology, social habit and cooperation, and perhaps a sense of social
73 Id. at 160.
74 Id. at 203.
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respect for others. In fact, Sunstein admits that natural rights may be
involved in the ordering of individual rights." Despite this recognition,
Sunstein insists that the ordering of rights, particularly speech rights,
should be understood as a creation of law.76 In this sense, Sunstein
indicates that the state has constructed its individuals. Sunstein, however,
fails to explain that an individual's own hard work, initiative, talent, luck,
and personal preference could be the primary mechanism for distributing
speech rights in our society. For example, Oprah Winfrey's ability to
reach millions of Americans every day is not a function of state
regulation of her speech rights but rather her own drive, initiative, and
talent.
Perhaps Sunstein's failure to account for other causes of rights
distribution is his focus on the "the way things are" or the status quo
neutrality to the exclusion of any analysis of the process of distribut-
ing rights. Sunstein's inquiry of the distribution of rights only reaches
back to the point in which a private citizen sought the state's help in
enforcing rights. Of course, from this starting point, the state will
always be involved in distributing the respective rights of individuals.
But Sunstein does not account for the process leading up to that point.
Sunstein's failure is that he is focusing only on the resultant distribu-
tion rather than the underlying social interactions of private individu-
als.7
7
Dr. Thomas Sowell, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution,
characterizes this type of failure as adherence to an underinclusive
"vision" of human affairs.7" Dr. Sowell sees two conflicting visions of
7S Id. at 5.
76 1d. at 203-05.
77 In critiquing Sunstein's status quo neutrality argument, Professor Mark
Tushnet illustrates this point when he observes that in Plessy "the Louisiana
legislature required segregation where it had not occurred before; it was, in that
sense, changing rather than ratifying the market-basedstatus quo." Mark Tushnet,
The Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1071, 1104 (1993) (reviewing
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 2). According to this analysis, there was
a sturdy pattern of social practice (without a genesis in law) that rejected
segregation on privately owned trains; and it was a social practice that required
the force of law, i.e., the Louisiana statute, to change the social practice for the
worse. Id. at 1104-05. Sunstein myopically focuses his analysis only on the
starting point where the law begins to regulate and ignores the underlying market
forces and human behavior that live beyond the rule of law.
78 See THoMAs SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES 39 (1987).
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human nature - "constrained" and "unconstrained."79 Under the
constrained vision, an individual's nature is static and predominately self-
interested; therefore, any attempt to change human nature would be
pointless.8" The role of the state then is to arrange human interaction to
achieve a better societal result.81 Under the unconstrained vision, an
individual's nature is one of virtue that should be improved by the
state.82 Obviously, Sunstein fits the unconstrained vision in which the
state has a dominant role in fostering public happiness. Sunstein's
analysis and critique of society then focuses on the end result rather than
how or why that result was achieved by the interactions of individuals.
Therefore, if in Sunstein's judgment there has been an unjust distribution
of rights (i.e., a bad result), the inquiry is not a causal "but-for" analysis
but rather an analysis of who will take responsibility for the bad result.
And, in the case of an unconstrained vision, the government will bear the
responsibility. This responsibility is not assigned by any in-fact causal
linkage between the government and the respective rights of individuals
but rather by Sunstein's normative judgment that government has a role
to play in the affairs of all individuals.
According to this analysis, Sunstein has not shown that the state has
in fact wholly distributed the rights of individuals. Instead, Sunstein has
merely offered his normative view that the state should be involved in the
distribution of those rights. Sunstein exposes this normative view when
he argues that the proper focus of state action is not whether the state has
acted but rather whether a constitutional interest is at stake. This
normative view does not help Sunstein describe how the state is actually
shaping and allocating the rights of individuals. In fact, even if the state
has been the single distributor of rights, this is not an argument that the
state should be the entity responsible for the distribution of rights.83 In
the context of speech, Sunstein fails to account for the many ways that
speech rights are distributed through individual interaction. Sunstein
underestimates the power and resolve of individuals to freely trade their
speech rights in a way that is advantageous to them regardless of the
intentions of the state.
791Id. at 19.
80 Id. at 19-23. Dr. Sowell is using Adam Smith's moral theory as the
leading paradigm. Id.
s Id. at 21-22.
82 Id. at 23-25.
83 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 214
(1994).
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III. NEW DEAL FOR SPEECH
A. The Problem of Free Speech
Sunstein characterizes the present system of free speech as a system
of private markets in which an individual's ability to speak is governed
by the profit principle. 4 A speaker's ability to speak is measured by that
speaker's ability to pay for access to newspapers or broadcasting
systems.8 For example, Ross Perot's ability to reach wide audiences is
attributed to his vast financial resources. Another aspect of the profit
principle at work is that newspapers and broadcasting stations manage
their businesses not simply based on the content of their messages but
rather based on what content will bring the largest financial returns. 6
For example, private individuals have a greater ability to speak if they
have the resources to pay for advertising. Also, newspapers and broad-
casting stations will determine the content of papers or broadcasts based
on what will generate more advertising revenue. In effect, an individual's
ability to speak, at least through these media, is determined by a market
system that operates on how much a potential listener is willing to pay
for a particular message.
B. Madisonian Republicanism Depends on the First Amendment
Sunstein believes that the problem with the current system of free
speech is that it does not promote the creation of a well-functioning
democracy. Sunstein argues that the First Amendment should ensure a
free speech system that promotes Madisonian Republicanism. He states:
I suggest that such a system is closely connected to the central
constitutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy. In such a
system, politics is not supposed merely to protect preexisting private
rights or to reflect the outcomes of interest-group pressures. It is not
intended to aggregate existing private preferences, or to produce
compromises among various affected groups with self-interested stakes
in the outcome. Instead it is designed to have an important deliberative
feature, in which new information and perspectives influence social
84 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 17.
8s Id.
6 id.
87 Id. at 18.
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judgements about possible courses of action. Through exposure to such
information and perspectives, both collective and individual decisions
can be shaped and improved."8
Hence, the primary mission of the First Amendment is to ensure that
citizens are well-informed and well-educated about important public
issues.
Sunstein describes a system of deliberative democracy that must have
two minimal features. First, the system "must reflect broad and deep
attention to public issues." 9 Second, the system must ensure "public
exposure to an appropriate diversity of view."9 With respect to the first
requirement, Sunstein wants to ensure that citizens are well-educated so
that they have better preferences with respect to electing representatives
or influencing those representatives to deliberate effectively.9' For
example, citizens cannot participate effectively in a deliberative democra-
cy if the information they receive from public programming or newspa-
pers is about "sensationalistic scandals and odd anecdotes not realistically
bearing on substantive policy issues .... ," With respect to the second
requirement, Sunstein wants to ensure that citizens are informed by a
"broad spectrum of opinion" or "sharply divergent views."93 Sunstein's
goal here is to foster a healthy marketplace of ideas so that, ultimately,
individuals may find truth. More importantly for Madisonian Republican-
ism, this marketplace of ideas would enable the representatives to arrive
at a universal conception of the public good.94
Sunstein uses seminal cases in which the Supreme Court defined the
First Amendment to support his view of the First Amendment. Sunstein
offers two different views of the First Amendment - Justice Holmes's
view as stated in Abrams v. United States95 and Justice Brandeis's view
as stated in Whitney v. California.96 In Abrams, Justice Holmes offered
88 Id. at 18-19.
89 Id. at 20 (italics in original).
90 Id. at 21 (italics in original).
91 Id. at 20-21.
92 Id.
91 Id. at 21-22.94 See id. at 18-19.
95 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
96 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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the traditional marketplace of ideas justification for the First Amend-
ment.97 Holmes stated:
[W]hen men have realizedthat time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
the free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.
98
In Whitney, however, Justice Brandeis offered a different justification: the
First Amendment is meant to ensure rich public discussion of political
issues and development of public and private virtue.99 Brandeis stated:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties .... [and] [t]hey
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American govemment.10
Although both Holmes and Brandeis desired greater speech protection
(especially for political speech), Brandeis offers a "romantic" view that
the First Amendment plays a central role in democratic government and
the development of human faculties."0'
Sunstein seizes Brandeis's view. With respect to Brandeis's goal of
political discussion, Sunstein argues that this view of the First Amend-
ment supports his argument that deliberative democracy must have a First
Amendment that not only permits public discussion but also requires
it.' 2 Sunstein argues that Brandeis's view supports the Madisonian
9 7 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
98 Id.
99 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
100 Id.
101 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 27.
102 Id. at 27.
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Republicanism conception in which citizens must be well-educated so that
they will have the proper preferences."0 3 In effect, the Brandeis view
supplements Holmes's view, and the Brandeis view shows a greater
commitment to democratic ideals.
While both views protect speech, Sunstein believes Holmes and
Brandeis would provide very different answers to Sunstein's central
concern: "What if government tries to regulate the marketplace in the
interest of promoting attention to public issues and diversity of
view?"'" In Holmes' view, the First Amendment should prohibit
government intervention in the marketplace of speech and ideas. But, in
Brandeis's view, the First Amendment should permit government to-
actively foster public discussion and assist people in developing human
faculties. Sunstein believes that this antagonism between the views of
Holmes and Brandeis accurately depicts the nature of the modem debate
on free speech and the role of the First Amendment.0 5
C. Preferences of Virtuous Citizens
In the Madisonian Republicanism view of self-government, the
citizenry must be well-informed because the citizens have a key role in
a deliberative democracy. The citizens must make decisions when they
select representatives and when they exert pressure on those representa-
tives. In effect, the citizens must be well-informed so that any preferences
they hold will ultimately assist the elected representatives in determining
the public good. The elected representatives, of course, also must be well-
informed when deliberating about the public good. Even in this system
of deliberative democracy, the citizens have interests that are communi-
cated through their preferences for particular representatives or legislative
courses of action. Preferences, therefore, play a key, yet not determinative
role, in Sunstein's deliberative democracy.
Sunstein explains this important role of preferences:
When there is inadequate information or opportunities, decisions and
even preferences should be described as unfree or nonautonomous. For
this reason it is most difficult to identify autonomy or freedom with
preference-satisfaction. If preferences are products of available
information, existing consumption patterns, social pressures, and
103 See id. at 27-28.
1°41d. at28.
105 Id.
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governmental rules, it seems odd to suggest that individual freedom lies
by definition in preference-satisfaction or that current preferences
should, on grounds of autonomy, be treated as the basis for settling
political issues. 106
In short, Sunstein believes that citizens'.preferences or autonomy should
not be respected for self-government purposes if the citizens are ill-
informed or have a wrong-headed view of autonomy. Recall that in
Justice Brandeis's view of self-government, the state has a duty to make
people "free to develop their faculties."' 7 Sunstein states: "[o]ne goal
of democracy, in short, is to ensure autonomy not merely by allowing
satisfaction of preferences, but also and more fundamentally by protecting
free processes of preference formulation."'
0 8
Sunstein does not define what characteristics a truly autonomous
person would have, but he does indicate that "autonomy is a form of self-
mastery, through which people are permitted to be, roughly speaking,
authors of the narratives of their own lives."'0 9 Sunstein, of course,
believes that government has a role to play in ensuring that people do, in
fact, attain "self-mastery":
Suppose that someone appears to want to be a prostitute, or to continue
as a drug addict, or to sleep at home in a bathrobe all day, or to watch
cartoons every morning and afternoon. It is hardly clear that the interest
of autonomy calls for respecting these "decisions," which may well be
a product of social conditions that fail to allow for autonomy, rightly
understood."11
In short, Sunstein wants virtuous citizens participating in self-government
and a government that ensures that these citizens become virtuous by
reason of diverse information. Government's role, then, is to use the
First Amendment as a license to regulate speech in a way that properly
informs citizens about important political issues. These informed or
virtuous citizens (in Madisonian terms) then can better govern them-
selves.
106 THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 176.
107 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
108 THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 177.
109 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 138.
110 Id.
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D. New Deal for Free Speech
Considering that citizens may not have the proper preferences,
Sunstein proposes a "New Deal" for speech."' Sunstein describes the
New Deal of the 1930s as a rejection of the system of laissez-faire. 1 2
In addition to a rejection of free market enterprise in favor of governmen-
tal regulation, the New Deal of the 1930s also rejected status quo
neutrality (the idea that government must respect private arrangements
and distributions). In a similar fashion, Sunstein offers his New Deal for
speech as a rebuke of current First Amendment views that government is
prohibited from rearranging speech rights among citizens. Sunstein rejects
the status quo neutrality view that somehow free speech rights are pre-
political or natural. Rather, Sunstein views the current distribution of
speech rights as wholly a product of law."
3
Sunstein's first premise for his free speech New Deal is that the
central purpose of the First Amendment is to bring about broad political
deliberation as conceived by Madisonian Republicanism."4 Govemmen-
tal regulation of speech is permissible if it is consistent with promoting
deliberative democracy as conceived by Madison and Brandeis." 5 For
example, governmental regulation of speech, otherwise constitutionally
prohibited under current standards, may be permissible under the New
Deal standards. Sunstein's classic example, which will be explored later,
is that the government may regulate broadcasting to encourage program-
ming of public interest issues or to diminish the power that advertisers
have over the content of programming." 6 The key litmus test would be
whether the government regulations "promote greater attention to public
issues" and "ensure greater diversity of view.""..7 Sunstein's goals are
to reshape citizens' preferences into a proper form and promote delibera-
tive democracy.
Sunstein's second premise in his free speech New Deal is that
because the state, through law, has in fact distributed all speech rights, it
has the right and the duty to regulate those speech rights in a way that
"' Id. at 16-52.
"
2 Id. at 29.
"1 id. at 44.
114 Id. at 34-35.
"' Id. at 35; see also supra parts L.A (notes 11-19 and accompanying text),
Il.B (notes 87-105 and accompanying text).
16 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 35.
"7 Id. at 37.
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comports with the requirements of deliberative democracy." 8 As
mentioned before, Sunstein redefines what it means to have state
action.1 9 In his new conception, the state acts in every instance that
private individuals rely on the law of contract, property, or tort. Thus,
when a citizen uses these laws to speak or exclude another from
speaking, the state is acting. 2 For example, if a private broadcasting
station uses the law of property to exclude others from using its broadcast
frequency, then the state is acting and enforcing a particular distribution
of speech rights. Sunstein also supports this premise by rejecting the
status quo neutrality conception that speech rights are pre-political and
beyond the reach of the state. Consistent with the New Deal view of the
1930s, Sunstein's free speech New Deal holds that the current distribution
of speech rights is a product of law rather than simply an arrangement
created freely among citizens.
The net result of Sunstein's analysis of speech rights is that the state
is wholly responsible for the distribution of those rights among the
citizens. 2 ' For example, if a citizen is poor and has no access to the
media, the state is responsible for that meager speech right. Conversely,
if a citizen is wealthy and has vast access to the media, the state is
responsible for that strong speech right. Therefore, as Sunstein argues, if
the state is responsible for the current distribution of speech rights, the
state has at least the right to regulate those speech rights consistent with
ideals of deliberative democracy. Sunstein's third premise transforms the
state's right to regulate free speech into a duty to regulate speech.
Sunstein's third premise is that important information is not getting
to the marketplace, and as a result, citizens do not have the proper
preferences to promote a just deliberative democracy. Recall that
Sunstein's system of deliberative democracy must have two minimal
features - "broad and deep attention to public issues" and "ensure public
exposure to an appropriate diversity of view."'2 Sunstein is primarily
concerned that in the American democracy, citizens' current diet of
information is steeped in bad or useless information - e.g., "tabloid
television" or sensationalistic stories about important events." Sunstein
118 Id. at 44.
1 " See supra Part ll.B (notes 58-66 and accompanying text).
120 See supra Part II.C (notes 67-73 and accompanying text).
121 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 44.
1 See id. at 20-21; see supra Part II.B (notes 87-105 and accompanying
text).
123 See DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at
62-63.
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is also concerned that citizens are only getting "centrist' views because
advertisers believe upbeat and noncontroversial programming sells prod-
ucts. 24 The serious consequence of bad information is that the citizens will
not have the proper preferences when participating in deliberative democracy.
Sunstein, of course, believes that the government is to blame for citizens' bad
diet of information because the government enforces the laws that distribute
the rights to disseminate the information. And, because the proper conception
of self-government is deliberative democracy, the government must distribute
rights in a way that comports with the structure of a deliberative democracy.
Here the First Amendment assumes its essential role of bringing about broad
political deliberation as conceived by Madisonian Republicanism.
The free speech New Deal then will redistribute speech rights in a way
that promotes deliberative democracy as conceived by Madison and Brandeis.
The government then can regulate in a way that encourages attention to
public issues and a commitment to diverse views. The First Amendment
would not prevent government intervention but rather encourage intervention
that promotes Madisonian ideals. For example, this New Deal would,
according to Sunstein: (1) promote quality coverage of campaigns, (2) ensure
high quality programming for children, and (3) decrease the influence of
advertisers over the content of programming generally.' Like the New
Deal of the 1930s, Sunstein's free speech New Deal thrusts government into
the role of ensuring that all citizens enjoy at least a minimal threshold of
fundamental speech rights.
Sunstein believes that his New Deal for speech is grounded in the First
Amendment case of New York Times v. Sullivan.26 In Sullivan, the Court
reversed an Alabama court decision that required the New York Times to pay
Sullivan, a state police commissioner, $500,000 in damages for libel.'27 The
New York Times had printed minor factual errors in an advertisement on
behalf of a civil rights organization. The Court reasoned that the press should
have broad immunity for criticism of public officials because political speech
is critically important for a well-functioning democracy. 28 The Court
adopted the First Amendment theory of philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn
who theorized that the primary role of the First Amendment is to protect
political speech. 2 9
124 id.
125 Id. at 83-88.
126 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
127 Id. at 256.
128 Id. at 269.
129 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 38.
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Sunstein argues that the Court's reasoning in Sullivan supports and
illustrates a number of Sunstein's premises in his argument for a New
Deal for free speech.Y3 First, the Court adopted a Madisonian view of
democracy and the First Amendment.' Second, the Court adopted
Sunstein's new conception of state action.3 2 Sunstein explains that the
Court rejected the notion that a private tort action for libel did not
involve government action. The state in fact acts when private citizens
use the common law to punish speech. 3 Third, Sunstein believes the
Court adopted his view that the state is responsible for the current
distribution of speech rights.3 4 Sunstein infers that the Court's repudia-
tion of the Alabama state court finding of no state action acknowledges
that government regulates speech every time private parties use the law
to distribute their respective rights to speak."'
E. Two Tier First Amendment
Sunstein argues "that the First Amendment is focused first and
foremost on political deliberation."' 36 Sunstein believes that the govern-
ment cannot regulate political speech "[w]ithout a showing of likely,
immediate, and grave harm."'37 The issue for Sunstein then becomes
what protection, if any, does nonpolitical speech enjoy. Sunstein argues
that nonpolitical speech also deserves protection but that this protection
is less stringent. Thus Sunstein introduces a "two-tier" First Amendment
in which the two tiers are defined in terms of the constitutional value of
the speech. 8 The constitutional value, of course, is in turn defined by
Sunstein's Madisonian view of democracy." 9
For an analysis of the role of Meildejohn's philosophy in the Court's jurispru-
dence, see William J. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14 (1965).
130 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 38-41.
"I Id. at 38.
132 Id.
133 [d.
13 4 Id. at 39.
135 Id. at 38-39.
136 Id. at 122.
137 Id.
138 d.131 See supra Parts I.A, I.B (notes 11-27 and accompanying text).
[VOL. 85
CASS SUNSTEiN'S "NEw DEAL"
The first tier contains political speech. 4' Speech is political "when
it is both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue."'4' If speech is political, then the government cannot
regulate the speech "without a showing of likely, immediate, and grave
harm."' 42 Sunstein justifies his Madisonian conception of the First
Amendment on four grounds.' First, history supports the proposition
that political speech is at the core of the free speech principle.'"
Sunstein cites: (1) the framers' intent to protect political speech, (2)
defining First Amendment jurisprudence of Holmes and Brandeis, (3) and
the Court's decision of New York Times v. Sullivan."5 Second, Sunstein
believes our current considered judgments about "high value" and "low
value" speech support the two tier arrangement. 146 Third, Sunstein
argues that political speech deserves greater protection because here the
government is most likely "to be acting on the basis of illegitimate, venal,
or partial considerations" to protect its own interests. 147 This third
justification stems from a basic distrust for government especially when
the government may censor criticism of itself. Fourth, political speech
deserves greater protection because it is vital to the democratic process
itself. 8 For example, if the government is responsible for poor cover-
age of a war, the government is in effect shutting off debate and possible
criticism of the war effort. The common thread running through these
justifications is that political speech is necessary to a well-functioning
democracy, particularly the Madisonian conception.
The second tier contains the nonpolitical speech not falling within the
first tier.'49 Sunstein argues that speech falling within this lower tier can
be regulated only on a showing of a legitimate government interest.'
Although Sunstein does not adopt one comprehensive justification for the
protection of nonpolitical speech, he indicates that a justification may lie
in some or all of the following interests: development of human
capacities or autonomy (rightly conceived, of course - i.e., "self-
14' DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 123.
141 Id. at 130 (italics in original).
142 Id. at 122.
14 Id. at 132-37.
'44Id. at 132.
14s Id. at 132-33.
141 Id. at 130, 133-34.
147 Id. at 134.
141 Id. at 136.
149 Id. at 123.
'-1 Id. at 123.
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mastery");' 5' usefulness of information, e.g., scientific discovery; 152
and, protection of nonpolitical speech that may have an important effect
on politics, e.g., works of James Joyce. 15 While Sunstein does not
provide a laundry list of legitimate reasons that could justify government
regulation of second tier speech, he does provide a list of illegitimate
reasons.154 Sunstein states:
From the discussion of autonomy and development of capacities, we can
start to identify a list of impermissible justifications. In general,
government cannot regulate speech of any sort on the basis of (1) its
own disagreement with the ideas that have been expressed, (2) its
perception of the government's (as opposed to the public's) self-interest,
(3) its fear that people will be persuaded or influenced by ideas, and (4)
its desire to ensure that people are not offended by the ideas that speech
contains.Y5
Sunstein believes that under this two tier conception, no major
changes would be required in the current law but that we will be better
equipped to deal with free speech issues.
F. Applications of Sunstein s Free Speech Theory
Although the focus of this Essay is on Sunstein's New Deal for the
broadcast and print media, an understanding of his views in other areas
will help develop a better understanding of his ideas for broadcasting.
Sunstein believes that the Madisonian approach would solve most First
Amendment problems.5 6 In fact, Sunstein seems to import tho Madison-
ian ideals used to justify the first tier speech into the justifications for the
second tier category of speech. Sunstein states that the Madisonian
approach "would offer considerable protection to second tier speech,
recognizing that such speech promotes a plurality of values and that
government frequently lacks a legitimate or sufficiently weighty
justification for regulation."' 57
'5' Id. at 148-49.
152 Id. at 144-45.
5 Id. at 149.
S4 Id. at 155.
155 id.
"56 Id. at 165.
15 7 Id.
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With respect to libel, speech critical of celebrities should not receive
the special Sullivan protection when the celebrities do not engage in
political speech." 8 Sunstein believes that in the Madisonian view the
current libel law is overprotective of speech because it permits injury to
citizens' reputations without any net gain for Madisonian ideals. With
respect to sexually explicit speech, Sunstein would change the analysis by
first determining if the speech is political.159 If it is, it enjoys the
highest protection. And even if it is in the second tier, the government
must have a legitimate reason to regulate it, which excludes any
regulation based on a finding that the speech is offensive. Thus, Robert
Mapplethorpe's work, which relates to the treatment of homosexuals, may
qualify as political speech and enjoy near absolute protection. But
Sunstein seems to believe that the state may regulate certain sexually
explicit speech if the speech in fact causes some real world harm such as
sex discrimination or sexual violence.1 60 With respect to securities law
and names of rape victims, Sunstein's scheme would allow broad
regulation because no political speech seems to be involved.' 61
With respect to hate speech, Sunstein believes it should be protected
to the extent that it "is actually intended or received as a contribution to
political thought about some issue," which for Sunstein would include
most hate speech on university campuses. 162 Simple epithets that show
contempt would not be protected. 16 Scientific speech falls into the
second tier; and it would be protected to the extent that government had
a legitimate interest such as national defense."6 With respect to art,
literature, and dance, the First Amendment provides first tier protection
if the particular form of expression satisfies Sunstein's definition for
political speech. 6' And if the speech is in the second tier because it is
nonpolitical, the government can regulate if it has a legitimate interest.
As with sexually explicit speech, the government can regulate speech if
it is causally connected with some real world harm. For example, if nude
dancing causes prostitution or sexual assault, the First Amendment would
permit government regulation. 66 Although this short discussion does
1s Id. at 160.
I-" Id. at 162-63.
160 Id. at 213.
161 Id. at 163.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 163-64.
165 Id. at 164.
166 id.
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not fully capture Sunstein's rich treatment of these issues, it should
provide a fair understanding of Sunstein's Madisonian approach to free
speech issues.
G. Traditional Critique of Sunstein s Self-Governance Theory of
Free Speech
Sunstein's New Deal theory of speech is closely related to Meikle-
john's self-governance theory of speech. Meiklejohn states:
[The] voters, therefore, must be made as wise as possible. [And] this,
in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests
relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the
meeting [in order] that all the alternative lines of action can be
measured in relation to one another.167
This theory, like Sunstein's, provides minimal First Amendment
protection for nonpolitical speech. 168 For example, a person's private
conversations with a spouse, parent, or colleague receive less First
Amendment protection than a campaign speech to a group of strangers.
With respect to Sunstein's definition of political speech, how do we know
if particular speech was "intended and received" as political speech?'69
Under this definition, any violation of a speech regulation would depend
on shaky determinations of the state of mind of both the speaker and the
listener. Moreover, this type of determination (by the speech regulator)
would necessarily involve an inquiry into the content of the speech and
subjective viewpoints of speaker and listener.
In response to the underinclusive argument, Meiklejohn broadens the
types of speech under the political speech umbrella - e.g., education,
philosophy, science, literature and. arts, and discussion of public
issues. '7 He claims that these types of "nonpolitical" speech do have
value to public debate. Sunstein adopts a similar approach claiming that
seemingly nonpolitical speech (e.g., art, literature, and even hate speech)
167 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOvERNMENT 15-16 (1948).
168 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899-900
(1949); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 44
(1982).
169 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 163.
170 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP.
CT. REv. 245, 255-57.
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may be political if it is actually contributing to debate on public
issues.17 For Sunstein, this ever-expanding umbrella probably reaches
even further than Meiklejohn's because Sunstein's theory of ubiquitous
state action reaches further into the everyday affairs of individuals. Also,
as noted before, Sunstein believes that even if the speech is nonpolitical,
the government must make a strong showing that it has a legitimate state
interest.' 7
2
It is unnecessary to fully rehash and develop the traditional critiques
of Sunstein's and Meiklejohn's self-governance theory because this theory
has received extensive treatment elsewhere.' 73 The key to critiquing
Sunstein's New Deal for free speech in broadcasting, however, is
realizing that his focus on politics and political speech may give short
shrift to nonpolitical speech. Moreover, his self-governance theory
requires extensive line-drawing to determine what is political or
nonpolitical. This line-drawing exercise also becomes more taxing when
determining what is high quality broadcasting or low quality broadcast-
ing. The traditional critiques of the self-governance theory also raise the
issue of who will decide how to draw principled lines - the state,
business, or private individuals. With these issues in mind, we now turn
to the central application of Sunstein's New Deal theory.
IV. NEW DEAL FOR FREE SPEECH IN BROADCASTING
A. The Problem
Sunstein provides a list of maladies that he believes afflict the
broadcasting market. His concern, of course, is a dearth of attention to
public issues and diversity of view. 74 As mentioned before, Sunstein
views quality information as vital to the proper formation of citizen's
preferences and in turn Madisonian ideals. 75 Sunstein first targets local
and network "news" as one source of useless information.' 76 He com-
plains that the news broadcasts do not deal substantively with important
7' DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 153.
172 See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
'
73 THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 68, 100 (1963); SCHAUER, supra note 168, at 36-39, 43-45; Chafee,
supra note 168, at 899-900; see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY
(1986); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSIoN (1970).
'74 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 58-59.
'75 See supra Part llI.C (notes 106-10 and accompanying text).
176 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 59.
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public issues but rather with "stories about local crime, movies, entertain-
ers, television, and sensationalized disasters."' 7 7 Sunstein particularly
criticizes broadcasting that reduces coverage of political campaigns to
"'horse race' issues," political strategy coverage, and "sound bites."' 78
When broadcasters commit their resources to "infotainment," Sunstein
believes citizens are not achieving the virtue necessary to effectively
facilitate a true deliberative democracy.
Sunstein also complains that the commercial advertisers control the
content of most broadcasting through their dollars.'79 And, of course,
the advertisers are not interested in public virtue but rather increasing the
sales of consumer products. What sells products is not weighty coverage
of elections and controversial public issues but rather upbeat, non-
controversial shows that put people in a receptive mindset for buying
goods. Sunstein cites an example of Coca-Cola pulling millions of
advertising dollars from NBC when the network reported about unfair
treatment of migrant workers by Coca-Cola.8 0 Similarly, NBC had
problems finding advertising sponsors for its television movie "Roe v.
Wade."' s Sunstein concludes that when advertisers dictate the content
of television, diverse information concerning important public issues is
displaced.
Lastly, Sunstein criticizes the broadcasters' endless programming of
violence and discrimination. 2 He cites empirical studies that conclude
that such programming causes real world violence and discrimination.
Again, the problem is that this programming displaces diverse informa-
tion concerning important public issues and that this programming fails
the Justice Brandeis ideal of encouraging the development of virtuous
citizens. Sunstein's solution, of course, to all these programming maladies
is to have the government intervene and ensure that broadcasters program
information that promotes the Madisonian ideals.
B. The Theoretical Solution - Regulation with New Deal Flavor
Sunstein's solution is government regulation. Sunstein relies on his
argument for the Madisonian ideal to justify this government regulation.
For Sunstein, the central purpose of the First Amendment is to bring
177 rd.
178 Id. at 60-61.
179 Id. at 62-63.
180 Id. at 64-65.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 66-67.
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about broad political deliberation as conceived by Madisonian Republi-
canism."8 3 Thus, the First Amendment not only permits government
regulation but commands it. Because the state, through law, has in fact
distributed all speech rights, it has the right and the duty to regulate all
speech rights in a way that comports with the requirements of deliberative
democracy.'84 If citizens are operating on "low-octane" information, the
"high-performance" deliberative democracy is going to stall. Sunstein
suggests that the government must adopt regulatory strategies that ensure
"broad and deep attention to public issues" and "public exposure to an
appropriate diversity of view."'8 5
C. Specific Regulatory Strategies
Sunstein does not propose an Orwellian 'Ministry of Truth' 8 6 to
regulate the broadcast media. Instead, Sunstein proposes "creative,
incentive-based strategies that move the broadcasting media in directions
more likely to fit with Madisonian aspirations."' 87 Sunstein suggests a
potpourri of regulatory strategies. First, the FCC should issue guidelines
and recommendations designed to bring about high quality program-
ming. '8 For example, the FCC could recommend that candidates
deliver substantive speeches, and that broadcast media could change
programming format to higher quality information and urge their
journalists to do better reporting.8 9 Second, Sunstein suggests that with
respect to children's programming, the FCC should: (1) increase funding
for -high quality programming, (2) enforce current legislation that is
designed to reduce advertising and increase educational funding, and (3)
require advertisers to subsidize high quality programming. 190 Third,
with respect to elections, government should provide free air time to
candidates and ban national projections of election results.' 9' Fourth, the
government should take steps to reduce the influence of advertisers.
192
183 See supra Part Il.D (notes 111-35 and accompanying text).
184 Id.
185 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 20-2 1;
see supra Part I1.D (notes 111-35 and accompanying text).
186 See GEORGE ORwELL, 1984 (1949).
187 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 84.
188 Id. at 82-83.
189 Id. at 81-82.
190 Id. at 84-85.
'91 Id. at 85.
192 Id. at 86-87.
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For example, the government could impose a tax on advertisers and then
use the money to subsidize high quality programming. Lastly, Sunstein
suggests that the government encourage high quality programming
through direct financial incentives or placing conditions on broadcast
licenses.'93 Each regulatory strategy will be considered in detail through-
out the following critique.194
V. CRITIQUE OF THE NEW DEAL SOLUTION
A. Introduction
This critique is organized around three basic criticisms of Sunstein's
New Deal solutions. First, Sunstein's interpretation of the First Amend-
ment is extreme because when the First Amendment was drafted, it had
nothing to do with Madisonian Republicanism as Sunstein suggests.
Second, Sunstein's theory of the First Amendment is un-American
because it subverts the American tradition of cherishing individual liberty
in favor of state conceptions of the public good. Third, Sunstein's New
Deal regulation of speech is a regulatory disaster that would produce the
opposite of its intended effects and would invite governmental abuse.
Sunstein takes the First Amendment, Americans' sturdiest shield against
government oppression, and transforms it into a sword of the state to
coerce each individual into becoming a virtuous citizen as determined by
the state.
B. Madisonian First Amendment: The Extreme Interpretation
The First Amendment commands:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'95
Sunstein's interpretation of this constitutional requirement is:
193 Id. at 87-88.
194 See infra Part V.D. 1.-V.D.3 (notes 245-80 and accompanying text).
195 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Congress shall make laws regulating freedom of speech and the press,
including broadcasting and print media, in a benign effort to make
citizens virtuous and to foster deliberative democracy.
Sunstein's interpretation is extreme because it transforms the First
Amendment from a shield of citizens against government censorship into
a sword of the government against the citizens. Sunstein's extreme
revision of the First Amendment runs counter to the framers' original
intent and traditional interpretations of the First Amendment.
Although most scholars agree that one of the most important themes
of the First Amendment is to ensure democracy,196 Sunstein's extrem-
ism stems from his allegiance to Madisonian Republicanism and the
incorrect view that the First Amendment was meant to be a tool of
government to serve this type of civic republicanism. Madisonian
Republicanism, as discussed before,'97 is only one of many theories of
self-government. Moreover, when Sunstein argues that the First Amend-
ment is a tool of Madisonian Republicanism, the traditional criticisms of
it are magnified. The liberty of individuals is subject to greater risk if the
government is going to use the First Amendment to reshape citizens'
preferences. If the government owns the First Amendment as a method
of implementing civic republicanism, the government will have more
power in undermining nonpolitical associations in society, such as family
and religion. It is in this area that government's efforts to change
preferences through the First Amendment would become more potent and
therefore realize greater clashes between the government's conception of
the public good and universal truths articulated by families and religious
associations.
Sunstein's extreme interpretation of the First Amendment as an
expansion of governmental power is also contrary to the framers' intent.
The mere notion of a Bill of Rights was not considered until near the end
of the draftng of the American Constitution.' Although the Bill of
Rights was intended to ensure democracy, the Bill of Rights was meant
as the states' protection against the expanding power of the federal
government - not a grant of power to the federal government to
implement a particular theory of self-government.'99 Unlike the Magna
196 See Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the
Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1115 (1993).
See supra Part I.C (notes 28-43 and accompanying text).
198 See WOOD, supra note 31, at 536.
"I Id. at 537-39.
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Carta which was a government grant of power to the people, the
American Bill of Rights was a declaration of individual liberty and a
security of the rights of the people against the government.00 With
respect to the First Amendment, Jefferson viewed this amendment only
as a guarantee that the states retain the right to control the press.2 ' This
type of sentiment grew from the dissatisfaction with the English
Licensing Act passed in 1634, which required all publications to have
prior approval of the state.202 Ultimately, with a mandate from the
Virginia Ratifying Convention that free expression shall not be interfered
with "by any authority of the United States," James Madison wrote the
First Amendment, which was accepted by the Congress in 1789.203
There is no evidence in the history of the First Amendment that it
was meant to secure "a completely untrammeled flow of ideas for the
development of an informed electorate."2 "4 Moreover, there was no
discussion that the First Amendment was meant to develop virtuous
citizens or responsive representatives committed to a deliberative
democracy.0 5 At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, the
drafters' view of citizens and democracy was limited to the privileged,
white male landowners - not women, Native Americans, or African
Americans."' The drafters' view of what constituted a flow of diverse
views is certainly different than Sunstein's conception. Sunstein's extreme
200 Id. at 539.
201 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IN A FREE SOCIETY 6 (1973) [hereinafter GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, MEDIA
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT].
202 Id. at 7. Other scholars have argued that the framers were instead
concerned about prosecutions for seditious libel. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18-20 (1941); William T. Mayton, Seditious
Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLuM. L. REv.
91, 95, 97, 117-20 (1984).
203 GEORGEToWN LAW JOURNAL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra
note 201, at 8.214 Td. at 6. With respect to finding meaning for the First Amendment,
Professor Blasi has commented that an interpretation of the First Amendment
tradition is more meaningful than "the effort to reconstruct a snapshot of one
moment in the remote past." Vincent Blasi, The Role of Strategic Reasoning in
Constitutional Interpretation: In Defense of the Pathological Perspective, 1986
DUKE L.J. 696, 701.
20- See GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
supra note 201, at 6.206 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 191 (1990).
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interpretation of the First Amendment therefore stems from a mistaken
interpretation of First Amendment history. Additionally, the Supreme
Court has not adopted Sunstein's view that the First Amendment is
government's mandate to regulate freedom of expression in a way that
serves Madisonian Republicanism ideas.
Sunstein seized Brandeis's language in Whitney v. California°7 to
show that the central role of the First Amendment is to make citizens
virtuous and promote deliberative democracy.2" 8 Again, Sunstein has a
strained interpretation of the First Amendment's pedigree and, in fact,
Brandeis's own interpretation. Sunstein's selective reading of Brandeis's
opinion is apparent. Although Brandeis did acknowledge the view that the
framers were concerned about virtue and open discussion of public issues,
Brandeis did not interpret the First Amendment as a mandate to the
government to shape citizens' autonomy and discussion of public issues.
In his concurrence in Whitney, Brandeis stated:
Only an emergency can justify [governmental] repression. Such must be
the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my
opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It is therefore always open
to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by
showing that there was no emergencyjustifying it.2"9
For Brandeis, the First Amendment remained a citizens' shield - not the
government's sword to carve individuals into virtuous citizens.
Professor Vincent Blasi has argued that Brandeis's references to
"civic courage provides the strongest justification for the principle that
individual listeners, not the state, must determine the boundaries of
communicative acceptability.""21 Professor Blasi analyzed Brandeis's
celebrated passage and in no instance found any support for Sunstein's
proposition that the First Amendment requires government to regulate the
marketplace of ideas to promote attention to public issues and diversity
of view. Professor Blasi states: "I think, that Brandeis wished to
emphasize the point that the first amendment represents a break ... with
207 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
20 See supra Part Ill.B (notes 87-105 and accompanying text).
209 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
210 Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 693
(1988).
1996-97]
. KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
the restrictive English understanding of the freedom of speech, as
incorporated in such common-law concepts as seditious libel and
constructive contempt of court.. z. With respect to Brandeis's statement
that "discussion affords ordinary adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine," Blasi states:
It is noteworthy that Brandeis never speaks of noxious doctrine being
refuted or eliminated or defeated. He talks of societal self-protection and
the fitting remedy. He warns us not to underestimate the value of
discussion, education, good counsels. To me, his point is that noxious
doctrine is most likely to flourish when its opponents lack the personal
qualities of wisdom, creativity, and confidence. And those qualities, he
suggests, are best developed by discussion and education, not by lazy
and impatient reliance on the coercive authority of the state.2
Thus, Brandeis did not view the state as the savior of low quality public
discourse.
The Court has not wavered from this understanding. In Cohen v.
California, Justice Harlan (citing Brandeis in Whitney) warned:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimate-
ly produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the
belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.213
211 Id. at 671-72.
212 Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added).
213 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (emphasis added). Justice
Harlan's statement of the purpose of the First Amendment clearly illustrates
Sunstein's unusual interpretation. An individual's right to free expression could
indicate three different companion duties. First, one at least has a duty to refrain
from interfering with the speech right. Second, one may have the duty to refrain
from interfering with the speech right and the duty to restrain others from
interfering with the right. Third, one may have the affirmative duty to help (or
coerce as the case may be) others to exercise their speech rights. The First
Amendment requires the government to assume the first two types of duties. In
Sunstein's interpretation, however, the First Amendment requires the government
to assume the third type of duty.
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Justice Burger also expressed this understanding in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,2 4 which invalidated a right of reply statute
requiring the print media to print the reply of a political candidate who
was assailed by the newspaper.215 In this case, a unanimous Court was
convinced that the governmental regulation of editorial control and
discretion was not "consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time."216 Justice Burger's reasoning
is also applicable to the broadcast media because the scarcity ratio-
nale" can no longer justify governmental intervention into editorial
judgment.21 Improvements in communications technology have expand-
ed the opportunities for free expression. Moreover, the print media is also
subject to some economic scarcity. Accordingly, Sunstein's reliance on
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC219 is now unfounded because ever-
expanding opportunities for communication obviate the need for
government to ensure accessibility to the airwaves.22° Even assuming
the scarcity rationale is applicable today as it was in Red Lion, the Court
did not revise the First Amendment to require government to make
citizens virtuous or to promote Madisonian democracy. At most, the
Court was concerned about the free flow of information, whatever the
nature of that information may be. Regardless of the fate of RedLion and
its accompanying scarcity rationale, Sunstein does not view unlimited
broadcast channels as the cure to poor quality broadcasting. In fact, he
views the proliferation of channels as a problem because it undermines
government's ability to make citizens virtuous.
To summarize this analysis, Sunstein's extreme interpretation of the
First Amendment stems from a complete rejection of the traditional
interpretation. But, in perhaps a more charitable characterization, his New
214 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
215 Id. at 256-58.
216 Id. at 258.
217 The scarcityrationalejustifiesjudicial intervention on the grounds that the
state has acted by distributing a limited number of frequencies to licensed
broadcasters.
218 See HUGH CARTER DONAHUE, THE BATrLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST
NEWS: WHo OWNS THE FIRST AhmNDMENT? 161 (1989); Donald E. Lively,
Modern Media and the First Amendment: Rediscovering Freedom of the Press,
67 WASH. L. REv. 599, 618-24 (1992).
219 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969) (upholding
fairness doctrine regulation against a First Amendment challenge).
220 Of course, Red Lion has not been overruled by the Court, and the Court
has refused to reconsider the scarcity argument.
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Deal theory is part of a First Amendment paradox.221 On the one hand,
the traditional interpretation of the First Amendment is that the govern-
ment shall not censor speech. On the other hand, another interpretation
of the First Amendment (e.g., Sunstein's) is that its purpose is to
protect meaningful public discourse. Hence, the paradox: "The First
Amendment cannot save itself without destroying itself."222 The re-
sponse to this paradox is that while liberal self-government does value
equally the notions of anti-censorship and meaningful public discourse,
the paradox arises only when citizens look to the government to make
public debate meaningful. At least in the American liberal tradition,
government is forbidden from meddling in the content and quality of
public discourse.
C. An "Un-American" Interpretation
Sunstein's New Deal for speech is "un-American" because it ignores
traditional liberal values. Sunstein's theory is elitist and paternalistic. His
theory requires the state to make citizens virtuous against their will.
Moreover, his theory requires that the government not respect the
preferences of the citizens if those preferences were based on inadequate
223information or opportunities. Sunstein states: "[o]n the Madisonian
view, genuine sovereignty entails respect not for private consumption
choices as reflected in market decisions, but for the considered judgments
of a democratic polity. '224 With respect to an endless supply of broad-
casting stations, Sunstein laments: "[a] system of this kind would not be
anything to celebrate. It could well entail the elimination of a shared civic
culture, which contemplates a degree of commonality among citizen-
ry.12 25 To bolster his theory, Sunstein refers to broadcast systems in
Germany, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, Switzer-
221 See Ronald KL. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an
Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1087, 1116 (1990).
222 ITd.
223 THE PARTIAL CoNsTrUION, supra note 2, at 176; see also supra Part
II.D (notes 111-35 and accompanying text).
22' DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 72.
Sunstein, of course, adds a qualification that swallows his entire theory. He states
that the public would be entitled to entirely reject government regulation of
speech. Id. at 73. But this qualification runs counter to Sunstein's New Deal for
free speech because he does not presently view the citizenry as autonomous and
able to make proper decisions.
225 Id. at 76.
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land, Canada, England, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Bel-
gium.216 Although these countries vary in the type of governmental
regulation, Sunstein celebrates the high degree to which the governments
of these countries control what the citizens view. In these countries, the
governmental regulation varies from subsidizing "high quality" program-
ming in England, to barring advertising in the Scandinavian countries, to
content regulation in France. 27 Sunstein's New Deal for speech may be
a typical approach to an "informed" citizenry in these countries, but his
theory is foreign to America where the population is heterogeneous and
committed to traditional liberal values.
When the Constitution was drafted, the framers were already
abandoning the civic republicanism conception of self-government in
which individual liberty was secondary to public virtue.22 This change
marked the end of classical Whig politics in which a homogeneous
society was set against rulers who determined the public good for the
populous. 29 In Europe, people were considered to be tied together in
unity through structures of title, families, or nobility.2 ° In America,
however, the people were considered to be an agglomeration of diverse
individuals coming together to serve their self-interests. 31 In America,
liberty meant personal or private protection of individual rights against
the government rather than the Whigs' public liberty.2 2 James Iredell,
a Federalist, stated that the aim of the American government was to
provide "for the security of every individual, as well as a fluctuating
majority of the people." 33 In 1788, Madison himself warned that
individuals and minorities must be protected from the power of majori-
ties. 4 By this time, the American government was not meant to
promote collective happiness, but rather it was formed to protect
individual liberties even against the public will.
Sunstein's New Deal for free speech runs counter to this American
tradition of individual liberties. Sunstein's theory teaches that an
individual's liberties - or what he labels as consumption choices -
should not be respected until those choices are a product of certain high
226 Id. at 77-81.
221 Id. at 71-88.
228 See supra Part I.C (notes 28-43 and accompanying text).
229 See WOOD, supra note 31, at 606-07.
230 Id. at 607.
23 Id.
232 Id. at 609.
233 Id.
234 Id.
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quality information and consistent with the considered judgments of a
democratic polity. Sunstein's underlying assumptions explain and
illustrate why his theory runs counter to the uniquely American apprecia-
tion of individual liberties. First, Sunstein's romantic, unconstrained
vision of human nature assumes that individuals are capable of virtue.
Second, Sunstein assumes that under certain conditions an elected body
can arrive at a single conception of the public good. Third, this concep-
tion of the public good is determinative enough to permit government to
impose this conception on individuals and reshape their private virtue. In
the narrower broadcasting context, Sunstein assumes that private
preferences for certain information must conform to the legislature's
determination of the public good, or else the government has the
obligation to reshape private preferences with what the government
believes is the proper information.
Sunstein's assumptions are elitist and paternalistic in the face of
traditional liberal values of Americans. With respect to Sunstein's first
assumption, there is a strong competing belief that individuals are
constrained in their ability to determine what is virtue and then live fully
virtuous lives. With respect to his second assumption, Sunstein displays
an epistemological elitism that legislators are better equipped to determine
the public good (perhaps because they are deliberating) than a common
citizen or even a priest or rabbi. With respect to Sunstein's third
assumption, if humans are capable of determining the public good for all
other citizens, why should legislators be the ones to perform the
epistemological determination. Perhaps, determinations of the public good
should be left to citizens, their families, and churches. Moreover, even if
legislators - rather than the common citizen - can determine the public
good, Sunstein does not explain why the government should force this
conception on unwilling citizens.235
In the broadcasting context, Sunstein's New Deal theory that
government officials can determine when there is a dearth of quality
broadcasting also illustrates his elitism and paternalism. Sunstein assumes
that government officials can identify low quality broadcasting. He
further assumes that if citizens want what the government believes is low
quality, the government can step in and force citizens to watch what it
believes to be high quality broadcasting until citizens begin to "freely"
choose the better broadcasting.236 As explained before, the better
23 This issue is similar to Professor Sullivan's concern that if it is in fact the
state that constructs us, one must offer an independent argument why the state
should do further construction of its citizens. See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 214.
236 See DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at
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conception of American sovereignty is to protect individual liberties from
intrusion and second-guessing by a well-meaning government. On this
conception of sovereignty, the people - not the government - decide
political and moral truth because the government is the servant of the
people. 37 This uniquely American conception of sovereignty remains
in modem constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Harlan admonished: "[the
First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us
31238
In response to criticisms of elitism and paternalism, Sunstein argues
his fall-back position that Madisonian Republicanism requires it. The
elitism is that government officials can determine and shape the
preferences of citizens. Sunstein responds that "Madisonian goals are not
preferences ... [and] [i]t is not unacceptably elitist to favor a system of
free expression that promotes attention to public issues and diversity of
view.""2 9 Sunstein argues that the broadcasting media should be viewed
as a system of "public education designed to serve all those who need
it." 40 Somehow, Sunstein simply does not view this as elite govern-
ment officials foisting their moral and political views on the populous.
With respect to paternalism, Sunstein views this as an inadequate
criticism because respect for private choices is not appropriate when those
private choices may be an unjust extension of current legal and social
practices.24 Again, Sunstein believes individuals are not autonomous
if they have limited choices. Individuals' choices are not to be respected
until citizens, as constructed through law, begin to make choices
consistent with the public good rather than their private consumption
choices.242 Sunstein bolsters his argument by pointing out that individu-
als often adopt precommitment strategies to overcome their short-
sightedness.243
Sunstein does not adequately address the criticisms of elitism or
paternalism. He only responds that Madisonian Republicanism requires
it. The single premise that determines his view is that the public good can
72-77.
23' SCHAUER, supra note 168, at 39.
238 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
239 DEMOCRACY AN) THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 91.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 74.
242 id.
243 Id. at 74-75.
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be determined and, therefore, imposed on the citizenry. If, as discussed
before, we deny that the public good can be determined, then the
criticisms of elitism and paternalism become ever more serious for
Sunstein. In the American view of sovereignty described above, all
citizens participate in forming a "will of the community" through public
debate. They arrive at political results reflecting compromise rather than
a single public good, and each citizen's self interest is reflected because
each citizen participated in the process of public debate and legislative
enactment. In this view of sovereignty, Sunstein's New Deal excludes
citizens from this process because the elite legislators or governmental
regulators dictate the public agenda and content of information.2"
Sunstein would cut people out of the public debate (in his colloquy, he
would not respect their "private consumption choices") if they are the
social and legal product of inappropriate and nondiverse information. In
his view, the governing would be left to citizenry with virtuous preferenc-
es (probably the educated) and the elected officials who are trusted to
capture the virtuous preferences and transform them into a single public
good for all citizens to live by.
D. A New Deal Formula for Failure
In addition to being un-American in its view of citizens and their
method of self-government, Sunstein's New Deal for speech is a
regulatory scheme destined for failure. A regulator can get his or her
arms around safe working conditions, just wages, and products flowing
through commerce; but it is impossible to effectively control speech and
expression unless one adopts an Orwellian command-and-control system
like the Ministry of Truth. And, even if government can control and
regulate the quality of broadcast media, there is no effective way for the
citizens to protect against governmental abuse. These serious concerns
will be addressed in turn.
1. A New Dealer's Mission Impossible
Sunstein proposes "creative, incentive-based strategies that move the
broadcasting media in directions more likely to fit with Madisonian
aspirations."" Although Sunstein claims that incentive-based regula-
tions would not involve content or viewpoint regulation, his New Deal
244 Post, supra'note 196, at 1117-18.
245 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 84.
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regulations would in fact require government regulators to keep a content
or viewpoint scorecard to determine whether the public is receiving high
quality information. Recall that Sunstein defines high quality information
as diverse information about important public issues. To determine
whether information is high quality, government regulators would be
scrutinizing whether certain views are being addressed and whether the
content of the information is related to a public issue. Sunstein may
object here that the free market of broadcasters would be making these
determinations.
Sunstein, however, is incorrect because although broadcasters would
ultimately make the determination of what information would be
broadcast, these broadcasters would have already been economically
coerced into the types of programming they broadcast. For example,
Sunstein suggests that the government "encourage" high quality program-
uing through direct financial incentives or placing conditions on
broadcast licenses.24 The government would also sponsor official high
quality broadcasting through nonbinding FCC guidelines for high quality
broadcasting.247 Here, according to Sunstein's own taste for "high
quality," the government's recipe for high quality broadcasting would
exclude: discrimination, violence, "infotainment," stories about entertain-
ment, "soundbites," and "horse race" coverage of political issues.24
Government's recipe would include: substantive coverage of important
public issues, diverse views of those issues, and any information that
tends to "educate" citizens.
A central problem with this content-driven regulatory scheme is how
to determine what is low quality or high quality broadcasting. As
mentioned before, elite legislators or regulators, with the best of
intentions, may not know any better than the common citizen what is
good or bad information. Putting aside the danger of government abuse
for the moment, these determinations of quality information are difficult
to make and even more difficult to implement and enforce. Sunstein fails
to explain how his New Deal regulators would quantify whether
particular broadcasters are producing enough high quality information.
For example, what if a Melrose Place episode dealt seriously with the
issue of spousal abuse while the News Hour with Jim Lehrer covered the
sensationalistic O.J. Simpson trial? How would Sunstein's regulators
246 Id. at 87-88.
247 Id. at 81-82.
248 Id. at 58-63.
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know which show made citizens more virtuous or contributed more to
deliberation on the public issue of crime?
Another problem with Sunstein's New Deal regulations is the
"Banned-in-Boston" effect that the more government attempts to regulate
a certain type of speech, the more government fosters this type of
speech.249 This is a common phenomenon in the case of hate speech
codes that are more frequently enforced against racial minorities (who are
supposed to be protected by the codes) than other students.2 11 Also, if
the government regulators push what they believe to be low quality
information off the airwaves, the same speech will move through other
markets such as: movies, newspapers, magazines, video and audio
recordings, and private computer networks. Unless Sunstein's regulators
are able to set up the Orwellian command-and-control center, they will
never be able to push high quality information into the minds of its
citizens.
2. Government Abuse in Its Most Serious Form
The most serious criticism of Sunstein's New Deal for speech is that
it invites the danger of government abuse. Whenever the government acts,
there is a danger of abuse. This danger is extremely serious when citizens
grant the state power to shape their preferences and liberties, to set the
agenda for public debate, and ultimately to determine right from wrong.
Sunstein's Madisonian interpretation of the First Amendment magnifies
this extraordinary danger by arguing that the First Amendment constitu-
tionally requires government to use it as a sword to carve up citizen's
preferences until they match those of a virtuous citizen as defined by the
state.
Before explaining some of the history of government abuse in
regulating the broadcasting media, it is worth noting the structural
damage that could be wrought on the American system of self-gover-
nance. A well-established theory of the First Amendment is that it serves
a checking function to curb the potential for abuse of power by govern-
ment officials.25' The broadcast and print media keep a constant eye on
the actions of government officials. Justice Stewart called this free speech
249 See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 214.
250 See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 512.
25 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FoUND. REs. J. 521.
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guarantee a structural provision of the Constitution that is not merely a
method of public debate but more importantly "a fourth institution outside
the Government as an additional check on the three official branch-
es." 2 If Sunstein's New Deal regulators began to wield control over
the content of the information of the broadcast media, the government in
effect would be chipping away the checking function of the First
Amendment. Private citizens would lose access to information that may
be necessary to check government abuse.
When Sunstein reforms the First Amendment to permit government
censorship, the effect on speech is far more severe than if private
individuals themselves controlled the content in broadcasting.253 If a
particular broadcaster refuses to program a citizen's message, the citizen
can go to another broadcaster. But if the government has put a cap on the
particular message the citizen wants to express, the citizen's message is
effectively suppressed."' Sunstein's theory effectively places citizens
in confrontation with the state over what information will be broadcast.
And, if government officials are abusing their power, it is likely they will
move to limit the information available to the citizenry.
Sunstein admits that there is potential for governmental abuse in
regulating the broadcast media. 5 He has two responses. First, he
believes that even in the face of governmental abuse, the citizens deserve
attention to public issues and diversity of view. 6 Second, Sunstein
believes that government officials are able to operate in nonpartisan ways.
He points to what he believes is the successful government regulation that
brought about local news, quality children's television, excellent
government-sponsored documentaries in the early 1960s, and public
television. 7 While Sunstein extols the virtues of Madisonian Republi-
canism and some success of government intervention, the broader picture
2S2 Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
" See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Fighting Back: Offensive Speech and
Cultural Conflict, 46 SMU L. REv. 145, 164-65 (1992).
" See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 207. Professor Sullivan notes that the
citizen may have to go to France, but as Sunstein has described the broadcasting
system in France, the citizen probably would not fare any better. Id.
25 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 88-89.
Sunstein states: "[g]ovemment is rightly distrusted when it is regulating speech
that might harm its own interest; and when the speech at issue is political, its
own interests are almost always at stake." Id. at 134.
2-6 Id. at 89.
257 Id.
1996-97]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of government intervention in the enterprise of free expression is one of
widespread abuse of the public trust.
Before exploring the chronicles of government abuse in the broadcast-
ing industry, it is worth noting that the proclivity of government officials
for abuse is a recognized truism in First Amendment scholarship. This is
particularly true for Sunstein's New Deal regulators who are to have
greater epistemological abilities than the common citizen. Hamilton
viewed these types of intellectuals as dangerous because of their desire
to follow "the treacherous phantoms of an ever craving and never to be
satisfied spirit of innovation. 258 Professor Schauer views these elected
officials and regulators as "more likely to become as concerned With
perpetuation of their own power as with acting in what they perceive to
be the public interest." 9 Professor Emerson also warned:
While there has been little study of the psychology of the censor,
security officer and investigator, experience demonstrates that many of
those attracted to these positions are likely to be more than ordinarily
influenced by the fears, prejudices or emotions which furnish the
driving force for suppression. Much of the day-to-day work of
administration is controlled by persons in the lower echelons of a
bureaucracy, where narrow adherence to rigid rules, fear of superiors,
and sensitivity to pressures carry the application of restrictions to their
extreme limits.
260
These descriptions of abuse inherent in governmental regulation are
clearly illustrated by the American experience with the regulation of
broadcasting.
3. Governmental Abuse of the Fairness Doctrine
Although government officials began a pattern of breaching the
public trust with respect to regulation of broadcasting from its gene-
sis,261 the fairness doctrine best illustrates the danger of Sunstein's New
258 SOWELL, supra note 78, at 66.
259 SCHAUER, supra note 168, at 43.
260 EMERSON, supra note 173, at 21.
261 In granting broadcast licenses, the FCC's decisions were often driven by
sheer political power. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND
THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 68-84 (1987). Powe's book extensively documents a
history of governmental abuse in all major aspects of regulation of the broadcast
media, and Powe concludes that the broadcast media ought to enjoy the same
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Deal for speech. The fairness doctrine is similar to Sunstein's New Deal
because it was a benign governmental regulation designed to require
broadcasters to: (1) cover controversial news and public affairs, and (2)
provide for reasonable opportunities for contrasting viewpoints.262 The
doctrine was found to be consistent with the First Amendment because
a scarcity of broadcast channels required the license holders to act as
fiduciaries for the public and ensure "an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas."263
Despite the best intentions by Congress and the FCC regulators, the
fairness doctrine soon became a fast moving vehicle of government
abuse. For example, after Barry Goldwater's nomination, the Kennedy
administration used "the Fairness Doctrine to challenge and harass right-
wing broadcasters and hope that the challenges would be so costly to
them that they would be inhibited and decide it was too expensive to
continue."'64 Wayne Phillips, a former New York Times reporter and
Kennedy-Johnson campaign coordinator, stated that "even more important
than the free radio time was the effectiveness of this operation in
inhibiting the political activity of these right-wing broadcasts." '265
Unlike the equal time provision (which requires a formal announcement
by a qualified candidate), the fairness doctrine is more easily manipulated
by FCC commissioners. 266 FCC commissioners could play favorites
because there is broad discretion in determining if there has been afairness violation.267 For example, in 1977 the Commission rejected a
fairness doctrine violation charge without a hearing even though the
matter involved whether CBS was grossly underestimating the Soviet
military threat.268
In addition to being an invitation to governmental abuse, the fairness
doctrine had the exact opposite effect of what it was intended to produce.
Instead of producing diverse information, the doctrine caused broadcasters
First Amendment protection as the print media. See id. at 248-49; see also
DONAHUE, supra note 218 (arguing that the fairness and equal time doctrines
unjustifiably sacrifice broadcasters' First Amendment rights that secure the pub-
lic need for information without any net gain in an overriding public good).
262 DONAHUE, supra note 218, at 33.
263 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
264 POWE, supra note 261, at 115 (quoting Bill Ruder, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce during the Kennedy Administration).
265 id.
266 Id. at 154.
267 id.
26 81Id. at 118-20.
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to avoid controversial topics for fear that the doctrine would attach and they
would have to provide air time for other views.269 They instead would
produce bland information. Recognizing that the fairness doctrine ultimately
"chilled" the First Amendment rights of broadcasters, the FCC abolished the
doctrine."' Moreover, at no time during the Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC271 proceedings did any party suggest that the fairness doctrine was
constitutionally mandated as Sunstein's extreme position suggests. 72
In addition to the fairness doctrine, the FCC has recently conceded
another regulatory failure with its financial interest and syndication restrictions
on networks.273 In 1970 the FCC adopted "financial interest and syndica-
tion" rules that were designed to limit the power of the three major networks
over television programming.274 In 1991, the FCC issued new rules that
limited a network's programming ofprograms produced by the network itself,
and that prohibited a network from syndicating its own programming directly
to independent stations.275 The FCC claimed that the rules promoted
diversity in programming by limiting the power of networks over program-
ming.2 76 Judge Posner vacated the 1991 rules finding them "arbitrary and
capricious. '2 77 Judge Posner reasoned that: (1) the FCC did not provide a
basis for its diversity rationale,27 (2) the new rules, as well as the 1970
rules, seemed to harm rather than help diversity,279 and (3) the FCC acted
in a "cavalier" manner by ignoring its own 1983 determination that the 1970
rules were unsound. ° As with the financial interest and syndication
restrictions, Sunstein's governmental efforts to regulate programming in an
269 LIVELY, supra note 218, at 608; Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 20, 49 (1975).
210 In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055 (1987) (affirming
elimination of fairness doctrine on grounds it does not serve regulatory and
constitutional interests), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
271 Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
272 Id. at 657.
273 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1994).
274 47 C.F.R. § 73.658G) (1990).
275 Id. §§ 73.658(k), 73.659-.662, 73.3526(a)(11) (1991).
276 Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1055 (7th Cir.
1992).
277 id.
278 Id. at 1051.
279 See id.
21 0Id. at 1053-54.
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effort to promote diversity would- also be plagued with governmental
ineptness, harm, and arrogance. In the free speech context, "arbitrary and
capricious" actions by the government are especially menacing because
speech is crucial to curbing governmental abuse.
To conclude this analysis, Sunstein's New Deal for speech fails for
three reasons. First, the First Amendment was not a child of Madisonian
Republicanism - rather it was meant to be a protector of individual
liberties against intervention of the federal government. Second, the New
Deal theory is foreign to the American commitment to individual liberties
to be cherished above any notion of public good determined by an elite
few. Third, Sunstein's New Deal theory is a formula for regulatory
disaster and a vehicle for governmental abuse.
CONCLUSION
Sunstein's interpretation of the First Amendment is a foreigner on the
landscape of traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. Sunstein's New
Deal for speech is at such odds with traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence that it would not even pass constitutional muster under his
own two tier First Amendment enterprise. The first tier protects political
speech, and the government may not regulate speech in this category
unless it makes a "showing of likely, immediate, and grave harm.""28
The second tier protects all other speech so long as the government has
a legitimate interest and it does not regulate content and viewpoint.28
Remarkably (in the face of his New Deal for speech), Sunstein states:
From the discussion of autonomy and development of capacities, we can
start to identify a list of impermissible justifications. In general,
government cannot regulate speech of any sort on the basis of (1) its
own disagreement with the ideas that have been expressed, (2) its
perceptionof the government's (as opposed to the public's) self-interest,
(3) its fear that people will be persuaded or influenced by ideas, and (4)
its desire to ensure that people are not offended by the ideas that speech
contains.28
3
281 See supra Part I.E (notes 136-55 and accompanying text).
282 Id. Sunstein's "legitimate government interest" is even stronger than the
traditional test because Sunstein does pot permit government to exhibit naked
preferences towards any group.
283 DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 3, at 155.
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Sunstein's first and second tier standards would clearly forbid any New
Deal for speech. Government's Madisonian Republicanism view of self-
government probably would not be a satisfactory showing of "likely,
immediate, and grave harm." Sunstein never reconciles this problem, or
perhaps he does not recognize the tension because he wants to stay within
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence while arguing for radical
government regulation in the name of Madisonian ideals.
Even though Sunstein has a reputation as a "centrist,""8 4 his First
Amendment theory is not. If adopted, his theory would likely spawn
outright censorship of political speech. Consider, for example, a recent
column by Anthony Lewis suggesting that government ban negative
political advertising.8 5 Although he did not give any credit to Sunstein,
Lewis chanted Madisonian Republicanism as the basis for his argument
for government censorship of political speech.2"6 Lewis echoed Sun-
stein's concern that citizens are not capable by themselves to reason
through the existing market of information. 7 Lewis calls on govern-
ment to protect us from what he believes is a limited human intellect.
While this Essay has not offered an alternative interpretation of the
First Amendment, the foregoing critique has illustrated that as a
descriptive and normative matter the First Amendment is not the state's
fiat to determine what is good and to force citizens to adhere to that
conception. By now, history should have taught us that when people
relinquish control over their thoughts to the state, tyranny soon follows.
The First Amendment is the people's best (and perhaps only) means to
retain their sovereignty and keep even the most benign government in
check.
284 Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1074. At least Tushnet, writing in 1993,
describes Sunstein in this way: "Sunstein's positions are somewhat left of the
present Supreme Court, and very slightly to the right of the center of today's
legal academy." Id.
285 Anthony Lewis, On Madison's Grave, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at A19.
286 id.
287 _d.
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